The Norwegian Hospital Reform - Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy by Lægreid, Per et al.
  1
The Norwegian Hospital Reform –  
Balancing Political Control and 
Enterprise Autonomy 
P E R  L Æ G R E I D   
S T Å L E  O P E D A L   
I N G E R  M A R I E  S T I G E N  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEIN  ROKKAN CENTRE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES 
UNIFOB AS 
DECEMBER 2003 
 
Working Paper 23 - 2003
  2
Contents 
 
PREFACE ...................................................................................... 3 
SUMMARY..................................................................................... 5 
SAMMENDRAG................................................................................ 6 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 7 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ............................................................... 8 
THE REFORM CONTEXT ...................................................................... 10 
Centralization: From county to state ownership ..................................................................10 
Decentralization: From public administrative bodies to health enterprises .....................11 
POLITICAL CONTROL AND ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY – SOME EXPERIENCES.............. 14 
The broad picture as seen by executive board members of regional health 
enterprises...................................................................................................................................15 
Cases illustrating autonomization and political control.......................................................20 
WHY AMBIGUITY AND UNSTABLE BALANCE BETWEEN ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY AND 
POLITICAL CONTROL?........................................................................ 23 
POLITICAL CONTROL AND ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY – BOTH PLEASE? ................... 27 
REFERENCES ................................................................................. 29 
  3
Preface1 
 
This paper is written as part of the research project Autonomy, Transparency and 
Management – Three Reform Programs in Health Care (ATMhealth) at the Stein 
Rokkan Centre for Social Research.  
The aim of ATMhealth is to study such processes of reform and change within the 
Norwegian health care sector, make comparisons with Sweden, Denmark and other 
countries, and estimate the consequences of such reforms. Three research areas are 
emphasized:   
 
1) AUTONOMY. The ambition to establish autonomous organizational units, 
with a focus on the health enterprise.  
2) TRANSPARENCY. The dynamics involved in the strive for transparency, 
exemplified by the introduction of still more detailed instruments for monitoring 
of performance and quality, as well as patient’s rights to choose and be 
informed.  
3) MANAGEMENT. To establish a more professional and distinct managerial role 
at all levels is a major ambition for most of the recent reform programs.  
 
A comparative research design is employed – regional, cross-national and global – in 
order to analyze the relationship between reform activities, organizational changes and 
service provision. The aims are to:  
• Generate research on the preconditions for change in health care by the means 
of comparative research  
• General competence development in organization and management of health 
care  
• assist the health institutions in their efforts to improve service delivery and 
create more innovative structures for organization and management.  
The funding for ATMhealth comes from the Norwegian Research Council and more 
specifically FIFOS,  Research fund for innovation and renewal in the public sector. The 
purpose of this fund is to create a concerted, multidisciplinary , long-term research 
effort , in order to encourage organizational changes and innovation in the public 
sector, and create the common solutions for the public sector of the future.  
 
Haldor Byrkjeflot 
project director  
                                                 
1 This paper is written as part of the ATM-project at the Rokkan Centre, funded by the Norwegian Research Council 
and the project on Evaluation of National Ownership and Business Management Models at the Institute for Urban 
and Regional Research and the Rogaland Research, funded by the Ministry of Health. An earlier version of the 
paper was presented at the 17th Nordic Conference on Business Studies 1416 August 2003, Reykjavik, Iceland. We 
wish to thank the participants at the workshop and Tom Christensen and Simon Neby for valuable comments and 
help. 
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Summary 
 This paper focuses on the balance between superior governmental control and 
enterprise autonomy by examining the Norwegian Hospital Reform. We describe the 
enterprise model and give a description of the policy instruments that the government, 
as owner, has for exercising power and control vis-à-vis the health enterprises. How the 
trade-off between autonomy and control is experienced and practiced is analyzed by use 
of survey data collected among regional executive board members, and illustrative cases. 
The trade-off can be characterized as ambiguous and unstable and we ask if it is possible 
to achieve a plus-sum game between political control and autonomy.  
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet fokuserer på balansen mellom overordnet politisk kontroll og 
foretaksautonomi gjennom en analyse av sykehusreformen i Norge. Vi beskriver 
helseforetaksmodellen og de styringsinstrumentene som regjeringen som eier har til 
disposisjon for å utøve kontroll overfor helseforetakene. Hvilke erfaringer som er gjort 
når det gjelder hvordan avveining mellom autonomi og styring blir praktisert blir 
analysert på grunnlag av en spørreskjemaundersøkelse til styremedlemmene i de 
regionale helseforetakene og bruk av  illustrerende case. Et hovedfunn er at balansen 
mellom styring og kontroll er tvetydig og ustabil, og spørsmålet reises om det er mulig å 
oppnå både politisk styring og foretaksautonomi samtidig.  
 
  7
Introduction 
 
New Public Management (NPM) has many facets and embraces a number of different 
reform components. It prescribes centralization and control as well as decentralization 
and autonomy. There is thus a tension in NPM between the need for greater managerial 
flexibility and discretion, and the need for a greater degree of political accountability and 
control (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a). On the one hand there seems to be a 
widespread belief that autonomization can enhance performance, accountability as well 
as political control. On the other hand, systematic evidence for some of the promised 
benefits is very patchy (Pollitt et al. 2001). In this paper we will examine on one of the 
most comprehensive contemporary NPM-inspired reforms in Norway, the Hospital 
Reform. 
In 2002 responsibility for the Norwegian hospitals was transferred from the counties 
to central government. The ownership was thereby centralized to a single body – the 
state. The reform also set up new management principles for the hospitals based on a 
decentralized enterprise model. One of the main challenges of the reform is to balance 
the autonomy of the health enterprises and the political control by central government. 
On the one hand the Minister of Health has the full responsibility for conditions in the 
health sector and a new department of ownership has been established; on the other the 
enterprises are given enhanced local autonomy with their own executive boards and 
general managers with powers of authority to set priorities and manage the regional and 
local health enterprises. The reform involves a strengthening of overall central 
government ownership responsibilities and control simultaneously representing a 
decentralized system of management. 
The focus of this paper is on the balance between superior governmental control and 
autonomy for the health enterprises. We ask how the trade-off between control and 
autonomy is practiced. Is it possible to fulfill the ambition of a good balance between 
political governmental control and decentralized autonomy, or is the balance difficult, 
ambiguous and unstable, due to different structural, cultural and environmental 
conditions?  
The Hospital Reform is still a novel one and is passing through a phase marked by 
interpretations and adjustments among the actors within the new structural framework. 
We therefore focus on the achievements or effects that eventually accrue from the 
process of the reform. We will discuss the transformation of the administrative 
apparatus both as a result of the structural features and as a more direct consequence of 
environmental factors and the historical–institutional context. We ask: Under what 
conditions is the balance between political control and enterprise autonomy influenced 
and altered? 
First, we outline three perspectives on administrative reforms. Second, we place the 
reform into the Norwegian context and present a brief history of developments leading 
to the present reform. We describe the enterprise model and give a description of the 
policy instruments that the government, as owner, has for exercising power and control 
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vis-à-vis the health enterprises. Third, we examine and analyze how the trade-off 
between autonomy and control is experienced and practiced so far – by use of survey 
data collected among regional executive board members, and illustrative cases. In the 
fourth section we discuss based on the theoretical perspectives why the trade-off can be 
characterized as ambiguous and unstable. Finally we conclude by asking if it is possible 
to achieve a plus-sum game between political control and autonomy.  
The empirical basis of the paper is official documents on the reform and a mail 
survey conducted in May 2003 to all 45 members of the five executive boards of the 
regional health enterprises. The response rate is 80 %. The case studies are based on 
public documents and press releases issued by the parliament (Storting), the Ministry of 
Health, the health enterprises, together with information from their web sites and media 
coverage in national and regional newspapers and the Norwegian Broadcasting 
Corporation (Neby 2003). 
Theoretical perspectives 
We use three different theoretical approaches to explain and support our arguments: an 
instrumental approach emphasizing the formal and hierarchical aspects of the reform; 
an institutional approach stressing the cultural features of the reform and the health 
sector, and an environmental approach bringing up arguments connected to 
characteristics of political processes and policy types.  
According to an instrumental view, public organizations change because some actors 
have a relatively strong influence on decisions and implementation, unambiguous 
intentions and goals, clear means and insights into the possible consequences of various 
solutions, resulting in effects that mostly fulfil the stated collective goals (March and 
Olsen 1983). The decision-making is characterized by tight control of the actors 
involved and unambiguous organizational thinking concerning the structural changes 
made (Olsen 1992). From an instrumental perspective specific goals provide clear 
criteria for selection among alternatives, and formalization structures the relationships 
among the set of roles and principles that govern behaviour in the system. This makes 
behaviour predictable and unambiguous through standardization and regulation (Scott 
1981). 
An active administrative policy encompasses elements of both control and rational 
calculation (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). It assumes that the organizational form to be 
used is open to conscious choice, implementation and control by central political-
administrative actors; second, it assumes a tight coupling between goals and means, 
which are fulfilled through different organizational forms; third, it assumes that different 
organizational forms have different effects; and fourth that there are criteria which 
could be used to assess those effects (Christensen, Lægreid and Wise 2002). 
These assumptions are difficult to fulfil in practice. The leeway political leaders have 
in reform processes are influenced by historical-institutional contexts and environmental 
factors. We will therefore argue that reform processes are not characterized by a simple 
instrumental view of organizational decision-making and change seen as administrative 
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design: rather, they can be understood as a complex interplay of purposeful choice 
constrained by internal and external factors. 
One set of constraints is represented by the historical-institutional context or cultural 
tradition, norms and values that can have major impact on the instrumental features of 
an active administrative policy. An institutional perspective focuses on the cultural features 
of organizations; frequently on how culture serves to make them stable, integrated and 
robust towards fundamental changes (Selznick 1957, Krasner 1988). Reforms may have 
norms and values that are highly incompatible with the traditional cultural norms and 
values of the political administrative systems of specific countries, resulting in difficulty 
in making reform decisions or implementing reforms, or in the modification of reform 
elements (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). But cultural and institutional features of 
organizations may also have the potential to further instrumentally planned reforms 
(Veenswijk and Hakvoort 2002). 
Environmental characteristics are also potentially important for developing and 
implementing administrative reforms. The degree of ambiguity and stability in the 
relationship between political control and enterprise autonomy can thus be discussed in 
an environmental approach bringing up the political processes that occur in the task 
environment. An environmental approach stresses that organizations exist in a dynamic 
and interdependent relationship with actors and groups in the environment. To 
understand ‘organizational environment’ one has to take into account the characteristics 
of the environment (Olsen 1992). We pay special attention to the relationship to the 
Parliament, to local pressure groups, to lobbyists and to the role of media. Controversial 
issues, scandals and unforeseen situations have on several occasions caused strong 
mobilization of political parties, media debate and growth of local pressure groups. 
Negotiations and external pressure can potentially both enhance and hinder political and 
managerial control: leaders may intentionally build winning coalitions with external 
groups and actors, but external pressures may also result in socialization and aggravation 
of conflicts (Schattschneider 1960). According to Lowi (1964, 1972) «policy determines 
politics». Public policies can be distinguished by their effect on society, whether costs 
and benefits are narrowly or broadly dispersed, and by the relationship among those 
involved in policy formation. The policy types create and identify winners and losers to 
various degrees. The level of conflict is especially high in redistribution policies 
involving efforts by the government to shift the allocation of wealth or rights among 
groups of the population. When a policy has redistributive effects, winners and losers 
are distinct, and the potential for conflicts and political intervention is high.  
When hierarchically-based instrumental reform processes run into problems, it is 
usually because of heterogeneity, either internal or external. Political and administrative 
leaders may have different opinions of how to implement the reform; there might be a 
cultural collusion between the reform ideas and traditional norms and values in the 
hospitals, or there might be turbulence and disagreement among actors in the 
environment. This can modify policy capacity and rational calculation. Reform 
processes can be difficult to control and ambiguity in organizational thinking may 
increase. 
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The Reform context 
Norway has been seen as a reluctant reformer (Olsen 1996). Until 1992 major public 
domains like the railways, telecommunications, the power supply, postal services, 
forestry, grain sales and public broadcasting were organized as central agencies or 
government administrative enterprises. But since the mid-1990s greater autonomization 
and agencification have become major components in the Norwegian-style New Public 
Management. The Norwegian reform process consists of a combination of internal 
delegation of authority to agencies – with a more performance-assessment regime – and 
external structural devolution through the establishment of state-owned companies 
(SOCs) (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a, 2001b, 2002). As a result of the public reforms, 
more autonomous and controlling agencies have also been established. Following the 
examples of New Zealand (Boston et al. 1996), the single-purpose model has 
increasingly replaced the former integrated civil service model where functions of the 
owner, regulator, controller, purchaser and provider were all performed by the same 
organization.  
The commercial parts of the government administrative enterprises mentioned above 
have all been corporatized, i.e. established as various types of SOCs, while the regulatory 
parts have retained their agency form. The hospital reform is, together with road 
construction and air traffic control, the latest examples of this development. The 
hospital reform is thus inspired by NPM, focusing on how to make the hospital efficient 
by introducing the business model and framework steering as a main political-
democratic control device. 
 Like the reform of other parts of public administration, the health reform is 
something of a hybrid, prescribing both centralization, by transferring ownership from 
the regional level to central government, and decentralization, by changing hospitals’ 
form of affiliation from that of public administration bodies to autonomous health 
enterprises. The reform has two faces – one that prescribes better governmental control 
and one that prescribes more autonomy to the sub-levels of the enterprise. 
Centra l izat ion:  From county  to  state  
ownership 2 
Like Sweden and Denmark, Norway has followed a pathway with a history of relatively 
decentralized and welfare-oriented health care system (Byrkjeflot and Neby 2003, 
Pedersen 2002). The takeover of responsibility for all Norwegian hospitals by central 
government marked the end of 30 years of ownership by the 19 counties and may 
signify a break with the common Nordic decentralized model of health care. The 
counties were assigned responsibility for institutional health services in connection with 
                                                 
2 Sources: The Norwegian Hospital Reform – Central government assumes responsibility for hospitals; 
http://odin.dep.no/shd/sykehusreformen, P. Hellandsvik: «New Health Organization in Norway. Government 
Run hospitals. Consequences for research and health services». Lecture held at Nordic Meeting for Deans and 
Teaching Hospitals, Reykjavik August 31 2001; http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv and Opedal og Stigen (2002a, c). 
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the introduction of the Hospital Act on January 1. 1970. Norway was divided into five 
health regions in 1974, and there was a voluntary regional cooperation between the 
counties up to 1999 when this cooperation was made mandatory. 
The question of takeover of responsibility for hospitals by central government was 
evaluated several times – first in 1987, then brought on the agenda in 1994 and 
evaluated once again in 1996. Only a minority voted in favor of increased freedom and 
overall state control. In the year 2000, however, a political process started that resulted 
in the new Health Enterprise Act of June 6, 2001.  
The Labour Party came into power in Norway in March 2000 with the Stoltenberg 
minority government. At its national congress in November 2000 the party decided to 
support takeover of hospitals by central government. The reform was then prepared and 
implemented at a rapid pace. Public hearings were held during the winter of 2001 and 
the necessary parliamentary majority was obtained in June. The novelty of the reform 
was the change of ownership combined with structural devolution (Opedal and Stigen 
2002a).  
There were several arguments for state ownership. First, the health sector is 
characterized by increasing use of resources, combined with continuous financial strain. 
The counties were owners, but in practice the central government had the financial 
responsibility (Hagen 1998). This resulted in unclear divisions of overall responsibility. 
The relationship between the state and the counties was often labeled the «Old maid 
game». The hospitals were the largest budgetary component in the counties, making 
them a burden in times of economic hardship and resulting in unpredictable lobbying of 
the Storting for increased financing. Second, the development of professional 
specialization of medical health made it necessary to organize the flow of patients across 
county borders and create larger units of coordination with more formal responsibility 
than the former health regions held. Third, the variations between the counties in the 
medical services offered were too broad, and access to health services depended on 
place of residence. It was, in other words, difficult to attain the national goal of 
standardization in the hospital sector. Fourth, the counties executed their ownership in 
different ways. Some practiced management by objectives while others exercised more 
detailed control vis-à-vis the hospitals (Carlsen 1995, Opedal and Stigen 2002a). There 
were also large differences in the utilization of financial resources between the counties. 
The aim of the state ownership was thus to come to grips with what was seen as 
unclear divisions of responsibility, different and ineffective use of financial resources, 
and disparate access to health services in the population. The running of the hospitals 
was attacked for being overly influenced by regional politicians with a low level of 
competence, for lacking professional administrative leadership and for being inefficient.  
Decentra l izat ion:  From publ ic  
administrat ive  bodies  to  heal th  
enterpr ises   
The hospitals also changed their organizational form from public administration entities 
to become parts of health enterprises. The new pattern of hospital organization 
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envisages the Ministry of Health as the owner of the hospitals, with an ownership 
department in the ministry as the location of administrative responsibility. Under the 
ministry five regional health enterprises with separate professional boards have been 
established, and in turn these have organized approximately 250 institutions into 34 
local health enterprises under regional auspices (Figure1).  
Parliament
(Stortinget)
Ministry of Health
Department of ownership
Southern Norway RHA Eastern Norway RHA Central Norway RHA Western Norway RHA Northern Norway RHA
9 HE
55 institutions
7 HE (+1*)
85 Institutions
5 HE
43 Institutions
6 HE
22 Institutions
6 HE
31 Institutions
Figure 1: The Health Enterprise model  
RHE=Regional Health Enterprises. HE = Health Enterprises.  
 
The health enterprises are separate legal entities and thus not an integral part of the 
central government administration. Fundamental health laws and regulations, policy 
objectives and frameworks are, however, determined by the central government and 
form the basis for the management of the enterprises. The organization of the 
enterprises stipulates in several ways how the owner may exercise control.  
First, central government appoints the regional board members. No politicians are 
members of the boards; the only group that has any formal representation is employees 
of the enterprises. There has been some debate on the composition of the boards – 
stressing that businessmen have replaced political representation. Table 1 shows the 
actual background of the board members and where a majority of members have an 
occupational background from the public sector. To a large extent the majority is due to 
the representation of employees. If these members are excluded from the calculation, 
there is a greater balance between the number of members with occupational 
background from public and private sectors.  
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Table 1. Regional executive board members: Occupational background.Percentages. 
 
 All Excluding employee representatives 
Public sector 
   Health Sector 
   Other parts of public sector 
Private sector 
Retired 
Unknown 
64 
42 
22 
24 
4 
7 
46 
13 
33 
37 
7 
10 
N=100 % 45 30 
 
 
Second, the owner exercises control through the health enterprise Act, through the 
articles of association, steering documents (contracts), and through decisions adopted by 
the enterprise meeting. The ministry has attempted to separate a formal steering 
dialogue (the «line dialogue») from the more informal arenas of discussion (the «staff 
dialogue») (Opedal and Stigen 2002b). Third, the state finances most of the hospital 
activities, and there is also, of course, a formal assessment and monitoring system – with 
formal reports on finances and activities to the ministry.  
The intention is that the formal policy instruments of central government should be 
strongly regulated. This is meant to safeguard the enterprises from detailed control on 
the part of the owner and help to give them genuine responsibility for their own actions. 
The principal idea of the reform is that the enterprise organization and the new 
management principles will reduce day-to-day management to the advantage of principal 
issues relating to priorities and hospital structure. Together with greater transparency 
this is intended to allow for «more steering in big issues and less steering in small 
issues». Of importance for the central government is to gain a stronger grip on 
management in relation to the structure of the health service, for example by means of 
the distribution of functions.  
At the same time the managers of the enterprises are given greater responsibility and 
freedom within the framework and structure laid down. The empowerment of the 
managers implies discretion for managers and boards and only limited involvement of 
the politicians. The burden on the political leadership is thus intended to be reduced, 
and through a sharp division between politics and administration, political control may 
increase. The enterprises have their own responsibilities as employers and are 
responsible for use of capital. The enterprises are also responsible for their own finances 
subject to the proviso that they cannot go into voluntary liquidation. The purpose of 
organizing the hospitals as enterprises is thus to decentralize the management process, 
produce more efficient management, improve access to information, and delegate 
financial responsibility within health policy objectives and frameworks. Through 
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autonomization the intention is to achieve less bureaucracy, an improved ability to 
manage change, and enhanced user information. At the same time, through its new roles 
central government must secure overall coordination wherever this is necessary and 
appropriate. In official presentations of the reform it is emphasized that the reform does 
not involve privatization of the hospitals operations: on the contrary, the reform means 
a tightening of current legislation. The Health Enterprise Act includes one provision 
which states that hospital activities cannot be transferred to private owners without the 
permission of the Storting.  
Last, but not least, it has to be underscored that the mainstay of control of the 
executive and central government by the legislature is the principle of ministerial 
responsibility. This principle implies that the minister is responsible to the Storting for 
everything that goes on within his or her ministry and in subordinate agencies and 
authorities. As such, he is accountable for how the administration performs its functions 
and tasks. This potentially implies strong vertical co-ordination and strong sector 
ministries, something which may well challenge the autonomy of the health enterprise. 
In summary the reform provides for decentralized management and delegation of 
financial responsibility at the same time as the Minister of Health, in theory, can instruct 
the regional health authorities and overturn Board decisions in all cases (OECD 2003). 
Consequentially the reform appears to represent a break with the stated goals of greater 
autonomization and delegation under the modernization program for the public sector. 
A key challenge is how to balance the autonomization of the management process and 
the delivery responsibility with the centralization of control and policy issues. We see 
the content of the reform as consisting of potential inconsistencies, a tension between 
centralizing and decentralizing economic ideas.  
Political control and enterprise 
autonomy – some experiences   
How stable is the trade-off between political control and enterprise autonomy, and 
under what conditions does the balance change? The existing grey zone of authority 
between the central political executives and the regional health enterprises makes several 
trade-offs possible. Since the reform prescribes both centralization and decentralization 
it is an open empirical question if the politicians’ control over hospitals will be 
weakened or strengthened in practice. One main argument for answering «yes» is that 
structural devolution changes the instruments of control and increases the distance 
between the political leadership and subordinate units (Egeberg 1989). On the other 
hand, state ownership and extensive use of contracts, political leaders are supposed to 
specify targets and objectives more clearly, and performance is to be controlled by use 
of quantitative indicators for monitoring results and measuring efficiency.  
First, we will describe the experiences of the regional executive board members two 
years after the reform. How do they look upon the relationship between the Ministry of 
Health, the Parliament and the health enterprises? Second, we focus on selected cases in 
which a delegation of political authority could be said to have produced unsatisfactory 
THE NORWEGIAN  HOSPITAL  REFORM WORKING PAPER  23  -  2003  
 15 
results leading to trouble with the Parliament, the media and public opinion. These 
controversial cases are presented in the last part of this section. 
The broad p icture  as  seen by execut ive  
board members  of  regional  heal th  
enterpr ises  
The board members contact pattern may give us a first impression of where the board 
members focus their attention (Table 2). The board members have most frequently 
contact with the local health enterprises but also have frequent contact with the media. 
Least contact by the members is with politicians in Parliament and the Ministry of 
Health as well as other central agencies. It is, however, more surprising from an 
instrumental perspective that the board members seem to have just as much contact 
with the former owners of the hospitals (local government) as the new owner (Ministry 
of Health). They also have as much contact with the parliament as they have with the 
ownership department, the Ministry of Health. Seen from an institutional point of view 
this is more understandable, illustrating path dependency and cultural trajectories. 
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Table 2. Frequency of contact by board members of regional health enterprises with various groups of 
actors.. N=36 (average). Percentage  
 
 monthly or weekly contact 
Central government:  
MPs 11 
Political leadership of Ministry of Health 8 
Ownership department of Ministry of Health 14 
The Norwegian Directory of Health and Social Affairs 0 
The Norwegian Board of Health 3 
 The health enterprises:  
Board members of other regional boards 33 
Board members of local health enterprises in the region 44 
The administrative leadership of the local health enterprises in the region 61 
Employee organizations 44 
Regional user/patient committees 6 
External actors:  
User/patient organizations 17 
Local government 17 
Media 39 
Local pressure groups 17 
Private health enterprises 9 
 
To what extent does this pattern of contact indicate the influence of these groups of 
actors on decisions made by the regional health enterprise board? This is shown in 
Table 3. The results are quite different from the pattern of contact. Even though the 
board members have only minor contact with central government, compared to the 
health enterprises, the influence of central government is considered substantial. 
Especially the political leadership of the Ministry of Health have high influence 
according to the regional board members. This indicates that anticipation and 
autonomous adaptation might be important in understanding relations between the 
health enterprises and central government institutions. But most important for the 
outcome of decision-making is the board of the regional health enterprise itself. Thus, in 
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their own eyes they are important actors with substantial influence on decisions made by 
the regional health enterprise. 
Table 3. What influence different actors have on the decisions made by the regional health enterprises. 
N= 34 (average). Percentage  
 
 Percentage answering that the actors have high or some influence 
Central government:  
Parliament 73 
Political leadership of Ministry of Health 88 
Ownership department of Ministry of Health 79 
The Norwegian Directory of Health and Social Affairs 38 
The Norwegian Board of Health 36 
 The health enterprises:  
The administrative leadership of the regional health enterprise 84 
The board of the regional health enterprise 97 
Employee organizations 37 
The local health enterprises in the region 50 
The regional user/patient committee 36 
Other regional health enterprises 0 
External actors:  
User/patient organizations 24 
Local government 3 
Media 3 
Local pressure groups 0 
Private health enterprises 3 
 
It is also worth noticing that external actors such as local government, the media and 
local pressure groups, attach almost no importance at all regarding the decisions made 
by the regional health enterprises. These results may indicate that the board members 
have a strong loyalty towards their owner (Ministry of Health), but still control the 
outcome of the decision-making within the frame-steering by the central authorities. 
Thus, the influence pattern reflects central components of the reform, as expected from 
an instrumental perspective. 
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More specifically, how do the board members consider the relationship between the 
Ministry of Health and the regional health enterprises? Table 4 includes some assertions 
about this specific relationship in the new organizational model. Most noteworthy are 
the results of the assertions of enterprise autonomy and central control. On the one 
hand, a majority of the board members agree with the assertion that they have 
considerable autonomy. On the other hand, a clear majority claim that the steering 
document from the Ministry of Health is too detailed. The results may indicate that the 
autonomy of the regional boards is high, but that the board members wish for even 
greater autonomy. 
Table 4. How the board members of the regional health enterprises judge the relationship between the 
Ministry of Health and the regional health enterprise. N=35 (average). Percentage. 
 Percentages that fully or partly agree  
There is a positive relationship of trust between the regional health enterprise 
and the Ministry of Health 
 
66 
It is often questioned whether it is the Ministry of Health or the regional 
health enterprise that is responsible for an issue 
 
9 
The regional health enterprise has considerable autonomy 
 
61 
The steering document from the ownership department of the Ministry of 
Health is too detailed 
 
75 
The management of the Ministry of Health is difficult to predict 
 
31 
The policy signals from Parliament, Ministry of Health, directorates and 
central agencies, are very often contradictory 
45 
 
Another challenge for the relationship concerns the policy signals from the Ministry of 
Health. Almost half of the board members agree in the assertion that the policy signals 
from Parliament, Ministry of Health, directorates and central agencies, very often are 
contradictory. The Minister of Health operates both as an owner, a financier and as a 
regulator and the minister himself pronounces that it is in practice difficult to balance 
the different roles at the same time.3 It is also worth mentioning that the board 
members are divided on the question about the relationship between the enterprise and 
the ministry. 47 percent of board members say that there is full or part agreement 
between the Ministry of Health and the boards of the regional enterprises; the other half 
report disagreement (not shown in the table). Despite this, the division of responsibility 
                                                 
3 Speech held by the Minister of Health, Dagfinn Høybråten, at the health enterprise managers’ annual meeting 2002. 
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between the Ministry of Health and the regional health enterprise does not seem to be 
problematic from the board members’ point of view.  
We also asked the board members more generally about challenges that the Hospital 
Reform may be confronted with. The main challenge for the Hospital Reform, as the 
board members see it, is a situation where political demands for expansion in hospital 
activity is combined with slim grants and possibly causing a situation where the board is 
unable to act (Table 5). Another challenge, as a majority of the board members see it, is 
a lack of coordination of the different roles of the state. As we have seen, the state has 
accumulated a wide range of different roles – as owner, purchaser, controller and 
regulator. The roles of the state also include financing most of the activities in the 
hospitals. In practice it is difficult to distinguish between the «line dialogue» and the 
«staff dialogue» as intended by the Ministry of Health. 
Table 5. What kind of challenges confront the Hospital Reform as viewed by board members of the 
regional enterprises. N=35 (average). Percentage 
 
 Percentages that fully or partly agree  
Scarce grants combined with political demands for growth in hospital services 
is the biggest threat for the hospital reform 
 
84 
The coordination of the different roles of the state, as owner, regulator, 
controller, auditor and purchaser, is insufficient 
  
66 
The regional enterprise does not have enough authority to manage the local 
health enterprises in an effective way 
 
14 
The organizational culture of the local health enterprises is a barrier to 
change  
 
44 
There is a lack of political support when it comes to closure or merger of local 
health services, e.g. maternity services 
 
62 
As an attempt to avoid political conflict, the regional enterprise does not put 
controversial issues on the agenda 
 
8 
Protests from local government and local pressure groups make a barrier 
when it comes to implementation of closure or merger of health enterprises 
 
15 
 
A third important challenge is lack of political support when it comes to controversial 
issues, i.e. closure or merger of health services, thus illustrating the external political 
pressure affecting the implementation of the hospital policy. Protests from local 
government and local pressure groups do not, however, seem to constitute a problem 
for the majority of the board members. The problem is held to be the politicians when 
it comes to controversial issues. And as the board members see it, they themselves do 
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not constitute a problem. Only a few of the board members agree with the assertion 
that as an attempt to avoid political conflict, the board does not put controversial issues 
on the agenda. In accordance with an instrumental view, they do not agree with the 
assertion that the regional enterprise does not have sufficient authority to manage the 
local health enterprises. More challenging is the organizational culture of the local health 
enterprises, as expected from an institutional approach. Roughly 40 percent of the board 
members claim that the culture is a barrier to change and modernization of the local 
health enterprises.  
 In summay, the new pattern of hospital organization envisages the Ministry of 
Health as the owner of the hospitals; the boards of the regional enterprises assign 
considerable influence to the Ministry of Health, and they also seem to be very loyal 
towards their owner. Central government is held to be more important than the local 
health enterprises and external actors like local government, media and local pressure 
groups, but the boards also claim to be strongly autonomous. They seem to combine an 
autonomous role with a strong loyalty towards the Ministry of Health, something which 
is not surprising since the Ministry of Health appoints the members of the boards.  
But the data also indicate that the trade-off between political control and the 
autonomous role of the regional enterprises might be unstable and changeable. The 
organization of the enterprises and the ownership by the state do not seem to fully 
safeguard the enterprises from detailed control by the owner. The Ministry of Health 
stipulates a detailed steering document that keeps track of the annual financial transfers 
from the government to the health enterprises. In addition, insufficient coordination of 
the different roles of the state and lack of political support in controversial issues, 
constitute challenges for the new organizational model.  
 In the next section we present a number cases that serve to illustrate the tension 
between political control and enterprise autonomy, and underline the importance of 
communication and co-operation between the central government and the enterprises.  
Cases i l lustrat ing autonomizat ion and 
pol i t ica l  contro l 4 
The Dentosept case. In 2002 a hospital infection affected a large number of patients in 14 
hospitals, the source of infection being a mouth swab. Between 140 and 180 patients 
were affected and 12–15 succumbed to the infection. This crisis caused a public outcry 
and it was high on the media agenda for several weeks. It soon became obvious that the 
case could not be handled through the formal channels of steering and control: there 
was a need for stronger hierarchical supervision and instruction as well as more informal 
and dynamic communication between the ministry and central authorities and the health 
enterprises. Because of the publicity and strong media pressure the political leadership 
in the Ministry of Health felt a strong need to intervene and to make its handling of the 
case transparent both to the general public and to the Storting. The ministry established 
                                                 
4 The presentation of these cases is based on Christensen and Lægreid (2003a, 2003b). See also Neby 2003. 
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an ad hoc working group to handle the case and the minister delivered a special report 
on the case to the Storting. There was a clear tension between the autonomous role of 
the individual health enterprises on the one hand, and the need of central political 
control and supervision on the other. Besides, the case illustrates the rift between the 
government as an owner and as a regulator. In crises like this there is a need both to 
clarify the accountability of the ministry and the political leadership, and to leave 
discretion for justified actions within the autonomous health enterprises. 
Closure and merger of local health services. Several of the regional health enterprises have 
proposed closing down health services and to concentrate health service facilities in 
central areas. This has resulted in local resistance and lobbying activity in an attempt to 
increase ministerial control over these enterprises. Several cases illustrate this dynamic. 
One is the initiative taken by the health enterprises to close down and centralize the 
maternity wards both in the rural districts and in Oslo itself. This resulted in a campaign 
across party lines by female members of parliament to prevent the closure of maternity 
services. The members of parliament in fact operated more or less as a lobby against the 
health enterprises.  
The reorganization and merging of maternity services is especially problematic in the 
north of Norway with its large administrative areas and dispersed settlements. In this 
region the local policy aspects and local and regional policy interests have been strong in 
the reorganization debate. There has been a strong local lobby and the Ministry of 
Health has pointed out to the regional enterprise that it would be «wise» to include local 
community actors in hearings and discussions about the reorganization of hospitals.  
Similar processes are observed when the health enterprises try to close down local 
hospitals. In 2002 the Mid-Norway Health Enterprise decided not to renew its contract 
with a local psychiatric institution. This resulted in criticism from the municipality where 
the institution was located and its MP asked the Storting how far the health enterprises 
could go in closing down the health services. When urged to intervene the Minister of 
Health referred to the formal procedures for controlling the health enterprises, but 
stressed the need for good dialogue between all involved parties. He was reluctant to 
overrule the decision of the health enterprise as long as the needs of the patients were 
being met and he referred the case to the chief county medical officer to check whether 
this was the case. But steering signals are still sent through informal channels. In a TV 
debate, the Minister of Health stated that in his opinion the regional health enterprises 
had undertaken actions in closures and mergerswhich were too radical compared to his 
intentions. This opinion has been emphasised and made more specific in enterprise 
meetings between the political leadership of Ministry of Health and the regional health 
enterprises. 
Following a cautious start the minister seems to be more willing to intervene more 
directly in cases of merger or closure of emergency- and maternity wards. In a few cases 
the minister has actually overruled decisions of the regional boards partly following 
pressure by the media as well as demonstrations and powerful protests from local lobby 
groups. On the top of that the Storting seems to be more willing to instruct the ministry 
in the event of closures, mergers and reorganization of local hospitals.  
National co-ordination of purchasing systems. Another interesting case is the establishment 
of common purchasing systems for all of the health enterprises – for advantages of 
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competence and economies of scale. Owing to regional policy considerations the 
ministry wanted to establish this unit in Vadsø, a small town in the northern-most 
county. There was a strong local lobby behind this location, but the whole idea was very 
unpopular among the health enterprises, and they managed to reduce the size of the 
unit. The minister announced that it was up to the health enterprises to make a unified 
decision, but he also made it clear that the ministry would not hesitate to direct the 
decision if necessary. In this case the ministry put strong pressure on the health 
enterprises, favouring central control at the expense of enterprise autonomy. 
Controversial lobbyism and «cheating» on DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups Classification). 
Lobbying can take many forms. One particularly crass example was when one of the 
health enterprises engaged a former health politician and member of parliament, now 
health enterprise board member, to lobby the government in a tussle with another 
health enterprise over patients. When the Minister of Health became aware of this 
activity he immediately put a stop to it, saying it was unacceptable for enterprises to 
employ lobbyists to influence their own owner. The same regional health enterprise also 
made the controversial move of commissioning reports from two business colleges to 
argue against and oppose the owner, the ministry. But the most controversial case 
related to this regional health enterprise, headed by a former top civil servant in the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, was the case of cheating on the DRG-system. 
DRG is a system whereby medical doctors code each and every patient’s disease 
according to a complicated typology of diagnoses. The more severe diagnosis, the more 
the hospital is reimbursed, something that obviously leads to many intricate strategies to 
obtain more money from the government. In this case, a subordinate doctor proposed 
to the health enterprise a new «creative» way of coding, something that the director and 
some single enterprises accepted. When this somewhat audacious method of cheating 
on the system was revealed, the minister mounted an investigation and the board of the 
regional health enterprise was instructed by the minister to react and report back. The 
director was strongly criticised and was stripped of many of his board chairmanships. 
Some single enterprise leaders were dismissed and «supplementary» grants are to be paid 
back.5 
These cases indicates first of all that it is difficult to limit central steering to formal 
arrangements only such as the enterprise meeting once a year, and the steering 
documents. Added to this there seems to be a dynamic informal steering dialogue going 
on. Second, the formal frames do provide the health enterprises with some autonomy as 
indicated by the cases of mergers and closures of local health services. Third, crises like 
the Dentosept case necessitating immediate action clarify the balance between 
autonomy and control. Fourth, there are clear options for political control in spite of the 
formal autonomy of the health enterprises as illustrated by the establishment of the unit 
for national coordination of purchasing. Finally, the cases illustrate that environmental 
factors like media coverage affect the agenda setting and the trade-off between 
autonomy and control. Normally, cases that receive high public attention tend to 
                                                 
5 This does not seem to be a unique case. A study from SINTEF Unimed indicate that three out of five hospitals 
practice some kind of creative coding to increase the funding (Aftenposten 17.6 2003) 
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strengthen the political control component, and not only in cases of principal 
importance (Neby 2003). 
To sum up: One intention of the reformers was to put politicians at arm’s length by 
excluding the regional council from the decision-making process and regional party 
politicians from the boards of hospitals. Although they have succeeded in doing this, 
political involvement is now tending to reappear in the form of local lobby groups and 
in an increased focus on health policy by members of parliament, thus challenging the 
balance between enterprise autonomy and central political control that the reform 
agents wanted to establish. Besides, more central control by the political executives is 
also looming because many of the cases shown decreases their legitimacy.   
Why ambiguity and unstable balance 
between enterprise autonomy and 
political control?  
Our survey-data showed that the regional board members seem to combine an 
autonomous role with a strong sense of loyalty towards the Ministry of Health. At the 
same time they report detailed control from the owner, insufficient coordination of 
different roles of the state and lack of political support in controversial issues. This 
ambiguity is further illustrated in the case studies, which also revealed that the trade-off 
between the autonomous role of the enterprises and political control seems somewhat 
unstable and unpredictable. The relationship can therefore be characterized as dynamic 
– open to change and modification.  
In this section we ask why the balance appears ambiguous and open to pressure based 
on the different perspective on administrative reform. It can be argued that it is not a 
great surprise that the balance is unstable and ambiguous, considering the hybrid nature 
of the new model. This reform, like the other NPM inspired reforms, has its roots both 
in the centralizing tendencies of contractualism and in the decentralizing tendencies of 
managerialism (Aucoin 1990, Hood 1991). And as mentioned earlier, ambiguity may also 
be caused by the fact that the reform is still a novel one. More interesting than 
documenting ambiguity is to ask under what conditions is the balance threatened – is it 
possible to understand and predict when the balance may be upset? We argue that the 
balance is due both to instrumental, cultural and environmental conditions. From an 
instrumental perspective a central feature of the reform is the formal basis of the 
relationship between the owner and the health enterprises as specified in the Health 
Enterprise Act, the articles of association, the steering documents and the general 
enterprise meeting. The question is if these documents and formal arenas of 
communication define a clear division of responsibility between the owner and the 
enterprises. Has the new Act and other formal arrangements clarified the former grey 
zone between the political executives and the health care institutions? 
The Health Enterprise Act states that major and principal issues should always 
should be presented to the owner for final decision. These are major issues concerning 
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health policy in general, research and education, and other cases of high social 
importance. In the articles of association some specifications are made. One example is 
the major changes in the organization, dimensioning and localization of the health 
services. But despite these specifications, we would argue that the room for discretion 
and ambiguity is quite large. Neither in the preparatory legislative work nor in the 
articles of association is there a clear and unambiguous definition of what is defined as a 
major and principal issue. Even though the respondents’ claim that the formal division 
of responsibility between the owner and the enterprises is quite clear, it is possible to 
question which issues have to be presented to the owner. There is, as such, a 
considerable leeway for different practice and interpretation. Correspondingly, many 
aspects of autonomy are not regulated in the formal framework of the reform. The 
trade-off between autonomy and control is therefore subject to continuous 
interpretation and adjustment, depending upon the situation and the issues on the 
agenda.  
To regard the Hospital Reform as the result of a deliberate plan by politically elected 
leaders with comprehensive insight into the effect of the chosen organization model and 
power over the reform process would be to present an incomplete picture. Politicians 
do not live up to the ideal preconditions of an active administrative policy, but this does 
not mean, however, that the idea of political choice and instrumental design has no 
explanatory power in this case. Through the power to intervene in individual cases and 
the use of indirect control mechanisms such as regulating the decision-making process, 
political leaders succeed in preserving a certain degree of latitude, albeit constrained by 
cultural features and environmental pressure.  
From an institutional perspective it is important to focus on the compatibility between 
the reform content and the established traditions within this policy area. The change of 
ownership as well as the introduction of the enterprise model challenges the traditional 
way of organizing hospitals in Norway. We should expect some kind of a cultural 
collusion, robustness and historic inefficiency when the reform encounters cultural 
constraints. This would particularly be the case in the ambiguous transition period of 
the initial years after the reform was launched and before it has settled into a new phase 
of equilibrium. The hospital reform is currently in its second year and it may well be 
argued that ambiguity between control and autonomy is also partly due to a cultural 
conflict between the former public administration regime and the new enterprise 
regime. The system has not yet developed a unique soul or identity, serving to create 
and maintain a grey zone between political control and autonomy.  
We would argue that the health care sector is experiencing a process of new identity 
building that can explain why there is ambiguity between control and autonomy. The 
enterprises have, on the one hand, changed names, corporate images and location 
(cultural artefacts). Through this process, one has tried to create a new identity for the 
organizations involved. It is stressed that the hospitals have become new entities with a 
new independent status, their own personnel and staffing arrangements, their own 
corporate image and own board of directors – one has tried to create a new corporate 
identity. On the other hand we witness tendencies of «path dependency»: we have 
interpreted our survey data as evidence of a clear loyalty towards the owner. This loyalty, 
however, may also be interpreted as evidence of a traditional culture in the sector. 
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Traditionally, there has been a close and near relationship between the health 
institutions as public entities and the former owners of the hospitals – the counties 
(Carlsen 1995, Martinussen og Paulsen 2003). As a core part of the welfare state, health 
policy has gained much attention among central politicians, both at ministerial level and 
in the Storting. One might thus argue that the culture so far favours political control 
more than autonomy. The actors in the health sector are used to making appeals to the 
ministry and MPs when principal and difficult issues are put on the agenda. It is also 
worth mentioning that a significant number of administrative employees in the 
enterprises were previously employed in the county health administration (Opedal and 
Stigen 2002b). 
Likewise, it seems somewhat difficult for the politicians to accept that the reform for 
which they had voted actually states that the politicians are supposed to practice «hands 
off» to a greater degree than hitherto. The NPM ideas of autonomization set some limits 
for state ownership. Devolution and increased power to the executive boards place clear 
demands on how politicians should engage in an issue that has been transferred to the 
health enterprises. Devolution presupposes that the role of the politicians is more 
principal and long-term, and that there is a clear division of responsibility between 
politics and administration. Politicians are supposed to formulate goals and visions, 
while implementation is left to the administration (Boston et al 1996). The hospital 
reform assumes that the MPs role is restricted to principles of management, and that 
they do not intervene and become embroiled in details as was often the case under 
county ownership (Carlsen 1995, Ot. prp. 66  (2000–2001)).  
The new and more strategic role for the politicians does, however, meet a strong 
traditional norm for political behaviour – where solving concrete and immediate issues 
is central (Aberbach and Rochman 2000). On several occasions Parliament has engaged 
in issues that formally were be determined by the executive boards. The female lobby-
group in the maternity cases is one obvious example. This shows that Parliament is quite 
uncertain about its new role. Intervention in single cases may be interpreted as an 
attempt to compensate for less control (Hood 1999), but with informal instruments that 
have no legitimate place in the new regime.  
Seen from an environmental perspective one has to take into account the characteristics of 
the task environment represented by Parliament, local pressure groups, the media and 
lobbyism in order to understand how the trade-off between autonomy and control 
occurs in practice, and how it changes over time and between issues. Parliament has 
devoted more attention to health policy since the ownership of the hospitals was 
transferred. In 2002, the first year of the Reform, the number of questions in 
Parliamentary question time covering hospitals and enterprises doubled compared to the 
mean number during the six preceding years (Opedal, Rommetvedt and Winsvold 
2003).  
Increased political attention to health policies takes place in a period when 
Parliament in general has become more important vis-à-vis the Cabinet (Rommetvedt 
1998, 2002, 2003, Nordby 2000, Espeli 1999). Over time Parliament has become more 
active and unpredictable. The nature of the electoral system in Norway makes multiple 
parties and turbulent parliamentary conditions likely, and this has been the typical 
situation during recent decades. This situation often reduces the influence of the 
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executive because the negotiations between the parties in the parliament become crucial. 
This is a kind of «super-parliamentarism» representing a situation when the Storting is 
considered too dominant over government exertion of executive power (Christensen 
2003, Rommetvedt 2002:69). State ownership combined with the present parliamentary 
situation (a minority government) can explain a greater political attention given to health 
policy. The Reform has strengthened the role of the MPs due to the fact that there is no 
longer any formal regional political influence over health policies. Besides, the Ministry 
has control over, and access to the entire range of policy instruments. (Previous 
responsibility was divided between central government and the counties.) The regional 
health enterprises are now regional owners and purchasers, and the local health 
enterprises are service suppliers. This has improved the conditions for vertical sector 
management and increased the power of central political actors while the former owners 
of the hospitals, the counties, have been relegated to the sideline.  
The parliamentary situation and a holistic responsibility placed on central 
government are also prerequisites for an increased tendency of organized interest 
groups to direct their attention to and lobbying of Parliament (Holmefjord 1998, 
Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999).  
However, the attention of Parliament, (local) pressure groups and media is not only 
dependent on structural and parliamentary conditions. We argue that it also depends on 
policy type. The empirical foundation is the observation that while some health issues 
seem to provoke only minor political engagement, others engender much turbulence 
and political debate. For instance, very little public and political attention has been paid 
to the allocation of financial resources from the regional health enterprises to the local 
enterprises. There has also been very little discussion about rules and guidelines for 
steering, control and resource allocation. According to these issues, the regional health 
enterprises have substantial autonomy and the politicians seem quite comfortable with 
their position at arm’s length from the enterprises. Other health policy issues have, 
however, created considerable public attention and political controversy. Many 
questions raised in Parliamentary question time have been concerned with economic 
retrenchment and about closures and mergers of local health services, and, as we have 
also seen, especially about reorganization of maternity services in particular (Opedal, 
Rommetvedt and Winsvold 2003). When these types of issue are brought onto the 
agenda, politicians and pressure groups are on the alert, and try to influence or reverse 
decisions as some of the cases illustrate.  
This phenomenon may be interpreted in terms of T. Lowi’s typology of policy types 
and his idea that «policies determine politics» – that policy proposals structure politics 
(Lowi 1964, 1972). Lowi reversed the traditional conception in political science that 
politics determine policy outcomes (Roberts and Dean 1994). Lowi argues that different 
types of policy issues will constitute different policy arenas and processes, with different 
actors and degree of conflict or cooperation. Lowi’s typology consists of four policy 
types: regulative policies, distributive policies, redistributive policies, and constituent 
policies. The potential of conflicts thus varies. When a policy has redistribution effects, 
winners and losers are especially significant, and the potential for conflict is high.  
In our cases, professionals, local interest groups and politicians first and foremost 
have fought against closure of local hospitals or certain medical services. The politicians, 
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though, have not only fought for their local hospital or service; they also try to maximise 
political support or voters (Schumpeter 1942, Downs 1957). When the counties owned 
the hospitals, the regional politicians hesitated to put issues that implied redistribution 
on the agenda (Opedal og Stigen 2002c). They determined the limits of cooperation, and 
thus prevented radical changes in the hospital structure.  
State ownership leaves the regional health enterprises to decide on economic 
retrenchment and to undertake changes in geographical distribution of health services. 
Despite this, redistributive policies still harbour considerable potential for conflict, –
triggering tension between central politicians and regional owners, and between decision 
makers and the surroundings encompassing pressure groups, media and local politicians.  
Summing up, we have discussed three sets of factors that may explain ambiguity, 
instability and dynamics between political control and enterprise autonomy in a reform 
that is in an introduction and implementation phase. The structural, cultural and 
environmental aspects of the reform leave room for interpretation and adjustment and 
the trade-off between autonomy and control seems to be the result of a complex 
combination of deliberate choice, institutional constraints and external pressure. In a 
process of interpretation, adjustment and uncertainty there is a leeway for political and 
institutional norms to challenge and influence the relationship between political control 
and autonomy. The tension becomes especially pronounced when redistributive policy 
is put onto the agenda.  
Political control and enterprise 
autonomy – both please? 
 The survey data and the cases studied revealed that there is a potential for ambiguity 
and conflict in the reform. The enterprises are loyal to the owner, but they also try to 
maximize autonomy. The politicians, on the other hand, experience loss of control 
when the enterprises live up to their autonomous role. The cases illustrate the conflict 
between a commercial logic, furthered by the regional health enterprises’ enhancing 
efficiency and economy; and a political logic furthered by local, regional and central 
politicians, underlining the political problematic and at times utterly unacceptable effects 
of such a policy. In many cases autonomization is challenged by political intervention in 
single issues and by other political efforts in order to enhance political control.  
The data presented reveal that in practice it may become difficult to live up to the 
principles of devolution and the official formal governance model of frame-steering and 
performance management. The slogan «more steering in big issues and less steering in 
small issues» seems to be easier in theory than in practice. This is in line with 
experiences from other reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2003a, 2003c, Pollitt 2002). 
The ministry is supposed to set policy objectives, to translate these into measurable 
targets and then actively monitor and review agencies and companies annually as they 
strive to reach the targets, and ultimately reward successes and penalize repeated 
failures. In many cases, though, this model gives an imprecise picture of what is 
occurring in practice. The ministries often set general objectives that are vague, 
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contradictory and changing, involving unresolved trade-offs. The ministry frequently 
allows the agencies to set their own standards and targets and neglects to monitor these 
targets. However, when something goes wrong and there is media pressure or lobbying, 
the ministry can intervene and withdraw some of the liberties of the agencies, formulate 
new rules and reprimand the agencies for actions that really should have been discussed 
or clarified at target-setting time. The situation may imply that the Minister ends up in a 
«Catch-22 situation». If he or she abstains from involvement, he may be criticised for 
being too passive: if he does intervene, he may be accused for not complying with the 
rules of the game. The Health Reform has made the role of the health minister more 
complex, characterized by cross-pressure and conflicting expectations. This doesn’t 
mean that the old system was perfect concerning central control and policy capacity, 
because the role of the counties was varied and ambiguous, and the focus on efficiency 
was weak. 
One import question following this conclusion is whether it is possible to achieve a 
plus-sum game between control and autonomy? Stability in the trade-off between 
autonomy and control is probably an elusive goal and achieving a balance between the 
two has been a recurring problem in Norwegian administrative history (Grønlie 2001). 
An unstable balance is a basic systemic feature that cannot be solved once and for all. 
Instead, one must expect to live with partly conflicting values.  
It therefore becomes a main challenge to find out which factors affect the trade-off 
between central control and local autonomy. In this paper we have focused on some 
structural factors, cultural factors and environmental factors linked to the parliamentary 
system in Norway. But type of policy issue and the political salience of the tasks and 
issues seems especially important. The cases clearly illustrate that we have to go beyond 
the legal status and formal powers of the agencies and the enterprises in order to 
understand how the balance between political control and autonomy works in practice 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2003b, Pollitt 2003).  
One main lesson is that context matters. The effects of structural arrangements, 
culture and the present parliamentary situation are dependent on the character of the 
policy issue that is on the agenda. If the issue has a redistributive character it seems 
especially challenging for the balance between political control and autonomy. What we 
are facing now is the ambiguity of the implementation phase and the optimistic 
argument is that once the balance of autonomy and control is fixed up in the new 
system it might be a better policy instrument. The more pessimistic forecast is that the 
underlying policy theory of the reform is based on a naïve assumption that it is possible 
to get rid of the political processes by introducing management principles and 
organizational forms from the private business sector, implying that the reform is 
doomed to be a failure in its initial version. 
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